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Academy Recommendations on the Proposed




When risk assessors face a situation of probabilistic uncertainty in
which they cannot minimize both false negatives and false positives,
what should they do? In dealing with situations of ignorance or
uncertainty, what default assumptions should they follow? Should they
assume worst cases or reasonably probable ones? Should they propose
risk standards to protect maximally exposed individuals or persons
receiving average exposures? Should they assume that future generations
have rights to protection equal to those of present generations? To what
degree do scientific experts, asked for technical advice on protection
from radiation risks, have the right to make policy recommendations
about whether to be conservative or permissive in setting standards for
public health and safety?
All of these issues have been at the forefront of debate over a recent
report published by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. 1 It
recommends standards for protecting public health and safety from
threats caused by radioactive waste disposal. This and another article by
Thomas Pigford discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the report.
Background and Overview
In 1992, Congress directed the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to promulgate standards to protect public health from
high-level radioactive waste in a permanent geological repository that it
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is considering building at Yucca Mountain.2 The Act requires the
EPA to set standards to protect the health of individual members of the
public and to ask the National Academy of Sciences for advice. In
August 1995, a committee of the Board on Radioactive Waste Disposal
of the National Research Council published the advice for which
Congress asked. 3
Since publication, the report has been the subject of great
controversy. Indeed, within the Committee itself, there was
disagreement about what advice the report ought to give to Congress.
2 The Energy Policy Act, P. L. 102-486.
SEC, 801. Nuclear Waste Disposal.
(a) Environmental Protection Agency Standards.-
(1) Promulgation.-Notwithstanding... any other authority of
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to set
generally applicable standards for the Yucca Mountain site, the
Administrator shall, based upon and consistent with the findings and
recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences, promulgate, by
rule, public health and safety standards for protection of te pub ic from
releases from radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the
repository at the Yucca Mountain site. Such standards shall prescribe the
maximum annual effective dose equivalent to individual members of the
public from releases to the accessible environment from radioactive
materials stored or disposed of in the repository. The standards shall be
promulgated not later than 1 year after the Administrator receives the
findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences
under paragraph (2) and shall be the only such standards applicable to
the Yucca Mountain site.(2) Study by National Academy of Sciences.-Within 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall
contract with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study to
provide, by not later than December 31, 1993, findings and
recommendations on reasonable standards for protection of the public
health and safety, including-(A) whether a health-based standard based upon doses to
individual members of the public from releases to the accessible
environment (as that term is defined in the regulations contained in
subpart B of part 191 of title 40, Code of Federal Regulations, as in
effect on November 18, 1985) will provide a reasonable standard for
protection of the health and safety of the general public;
(B) whether it is reasonable to assume that a system for
post-closure oversight of the repository can be developed, based upon
active institutionaf controls, that will prevent an unreasonable risk. of
breaching the repository's engineered or geologic barriers or increasing
the exposure of individual members of the pu lic to radiation beyond
allowable limits; and
(C) whether it is possible to make scientifically supportable
predictions of the probability that the repository's engineered or
geologic barriers will be breached as a result of human intrusion over aperiod of 10,000 y ears,
- o(3) App icability.-The provisions of this section shall apply to
the Yucca Mountain site, rather than any other authority of the
Administrator to set generally applicable standards for radiation
protection.
Technical Bases, supra note 1.
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Members agreed on most points, but on one issue they diverged. In
recommending assumptions for calculating radiation exposures to
people in the far future, there was conflict. The Committee presented
two alternative exposure scenarios, one involving the "probabilistic
critical group" and another involving the "subsistence-farmer critical
group." Because the subsistence farmer is the individual at calculated
maximum risk, that scenario is conservative and bounding with respect
to public health and safety. The probabilistic critical group, however, is
based on individual assessors' choices of reference populations and, as
such, may be susceptible to manipulation by those performing the
calculations. For this reason, the probabilistic critical group may not
include the individual at calculated maximum risk and thus may be a
more permissive scenario (than that of the subsistence-farmer critical
group). Some would argue that it is also a more realistic scenario with
respect to public health and safety. A majority of members writing the
Academy report sanctioned the use of either the probabilistic critical
group or the subsistence-farmer group, in calculating repository-related
radiation exposures to people in the far future. One member, however,
disagreed and said only the subsistence-farmer scenario was reasonable.
This member is nuclear engineer Thomas Pigford, one of the most
distinguished experts on the Committee.4
Who is correct, Pigford or the rest of the Committee? One way to
answer this question is to consult his companion article. A second is to
investigate the strengths and weaknesses of the report, independent of
Pigford's criticisms. This essay follows the second course but
recommends that people also read his analysis. It argues that, despite
the strengths of the Academy recommendations on Yucca
Mountain, 5 the document falls victim to at least three significant
weaknesses: (1) its bibliographical resources are incomplete, and this
incompleteness may have skewed its conclusions; (2) the Committee is
underrepresented in the areas of public health, hydrology and geology,
and overrepresented in physics and engineering, and this imbalance in
membership may have skewed the Committee conclusions; (3) because
4 See Thomas Pigford, Maximum Individual Dose and Vicinity-Average Dose
for a Geological Repository Containing Radioactive Waste, infra; Thomas Pigford,
Personal Supplementary Statement in Technical Bases, supra note 1. at 161-185.
5 Technical Bases, supra note 1..
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the Committee sanctioned moving from both dose and risk standards
for radiation to merely a risk standard, its recommendations are less
protective of public health and safety than those of the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), the world's most
important standard-setting agency for radiation.
The Strengths of the National Academy Report
The report is a landmark that significantly advances our
understanding of both the science and the policy relevant to high-level
radioactive waste disposal. It has many assets, especially its
recommendation that compliance with the risk standard for radioactive
waste be measured at the time of peak risk, whenever it occurs;6 its
conclusion that there is no scientific basis for limiting health-and-safety
concern merely to 10,000 years7 and its important stance on
protecting intergenerational equity.
The report also does an excellent job of emphasizing the fact that it
is impossible to assess the frequency of intrusion into a permanent
nuclear-waste repository for a million years into the future. 8 It
explains effectively that there is no system (based on active institutional
controls), for post-closure oversight of a repository, that can prevent an
unreasonable risk of breaching the engineered barriers. 9
It is clear and straightforward about many important uncertainties
in its recommendations about radioactive waste disposal, site modelling
and performance assessment generally. 10 It also does an excellent job
of emphasizing that there is no sharp dividing line between science and
policy,11 that there is a limited scientific basis for choosing one policy
option over another, 12 and that the Committee ought not recommend
what levels of radiological risk (to the public) are acceptable because this
is a policy decision. 13 The Committee does a superb job of charting a
6 Id. at 2, 55-56, 67.
7 Id. at 56.
8 id. at 2, 73.
9 Id. at 11.
10 Id. at 19-20.
11 Id. at viii
12 Id
13 Id. at 20, 4 9.
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thoughtful and even-handed course through the tangled morass of
science and policy issues.
Perhaps most importantly, the National Academy report correctly
calls for choosing Yucca Mountain exposure scenarios on the basis of
rule making with full public participation. 14 Such conclusions and
recommendations are especially balanced and credible. The breadth
and accuracy of the document are remarkable. Despite these strengths,
however, three aspects of the report raise concerns: (1) its
bibliographical incompleteness; (2) its partially skewed committee
membership; and (3) its recommendations' being less protective of
public health than those of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP).
Bibliographical Incompleteness
One bibliographical concern is that the massive 1992 document of
the Department of Energy (DOE) peer reviewers, on the Early Site
Suitability Evaluation (ESSE) for Yucca Mountain, neither is in the
report's bibliography nor appears to have been part of the Committee's
deliberations. This document is significant because it is the product of
fourteen of the most distinguished geologists and earth scientists in the
nation and because the peer reviewers' consensus statement appears to
challenge some of the Committee's conclusions. In particular, the peer
reviewers' consensus statement challenges the feasibility of many long-
term geological estimates at Yucca Mountain, the very estimates that
the Academy report said were possible.
Because the Committee's confidence in long-term geological
estimation, adequate for performance assessment and compliance,
seems at odds with the consensus conclusions of the fourteen DOE peer
reviewers for Yucca Mountain, it is important to examine what each
group says. After discussing difficulties with the "subjective judgments"
in the ESSE, 15 the DOE reviewers (primarily geologists) unanimously
concluded, in a "Consensus Position":1 6
14 Id. at 99, 127.
15 See Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case
Against Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste, 123-124, 152-153, 164-168, 175
(1993).
16 J. L. Younker, et al., Report of the Peer Review Panel on the Early Site Suitability
Evaluation of the Potential Repository Site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, B2 (DOE
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It is the opinion of the panel that many aspects of site
suitability are not well suited for quantitative risk
assessment. In particular are predictions involving future
geological activity, future value of mineral deposits, and
mineral occurrence models. Any projections of the rates of
tectonic activity and volcanism, as well as natural resource
occurrence and value, will be fraught with substantial
uncertainties that cannot be quantified using standard
statistical methods.
Although the DOE peer reviewers' "Consensus Position" may be
consistent with the geological conclusions of the Academy report, their
apparent incompatibility bears examination. Yet, the Academy report
did not examine this apparent inconsistency. Despite the peer reviewers'
misgivings about long-term risk assessments and future estimates of
volcanic and seismic activities at Yucca Mountain, instead the Academy
report claims, for example: 17
We conclude that the probabilities and consequences of
modifications generated by climate change, seismic activity,
and volcanic eruptions at Yucca Mountain are sufficiently
boundable so that these factors can be included in
performance assessments that extend over periods on the
order of about 106 years.
Established procedures of risk analysis should enable the
combination of the results of all repository system
simulations into a single estimated risk to be compared with
the standard. (Human intrusion is excluded from such a
combination.)
Processes are sufficiently boundable that they can be
included in performance assessments that extend over time
frames... on the order of about 106 years.
It is possible through careful examination of the geologic
record to establish a chronological history of the activity
over millions of years. Estimates of activity over similar
periods into the future can be made by extrapolation from
the past activity.
Whether or not the report agrees with peer reviewers is not the main
issue, however. The real concern is that the peer reviewers appear to have
raised significant questions that it would have been good to address
explicitly in the report. Such questions include:
* If the Committee believes that future societal events cannot be
1992).
17 Technical Bases, supra note 1. at 91, 69, 85 and 93, respectively.
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predicted, 18 but if future societal events could influence "geological
engineering factors," then how are geological engineering factors
susceptible to realistic estimation?
* Given massive uncertainties and problems with verification and
validation of computer models of future geological events, 19 should
million-year performance assessments or million-year estimates of
geological events be reliable?
* Are claims about repository compliance and million-year
geological estimates matters of expert opinion or science?
* If the Committee finds serious uncertainties about 1 4 C0 2
exposures;20 nonuniform radionuclide distributions;2 1 fracture flow,
especially in the unsaturated zone22 and "several glacial periods"
during the million years of the repository, 2 3 then how can it place
confidence in the million-year geological estimates already mentioned?
While the previous questions, suggested by the "Consensus
Position" of the fourteen DOE peer reviewers, may have reasonable
answers, the inclusion and discussion of the thick peer reviewers'
document - absent from the report bibliography - might have
clarified some of these issues. Although no single Committee can do
everything, nevertheless inclusion and discussion of the DOE peer
reviewers' document might have enabled the Committee to address
some important and precisely focused geological questions. 24 The
Academy's prestige often gives it "the last word." It cannot have the last
word, however, if it relies on repository proponents to give it only the
documents that the DOE proponents think the Academy needs.
18 Id. at 96.
19 Naomi Oreskes, Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette & Kenneth Belitz, Verification,
Validation, and Confirmation of Numerical Models in the Earth Sciences, 263
Science 64 (1994).
20 Technical Bases, supra note 1. at 87-88.
21 Id. at 88-89.
22 Id. at 88-90.
23 Id. at 97.
24 See Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Waste: The Academy and Million-
Year Estimates, 71 Q. Rev. Biology 1 (1996).
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Committee Membership: Imbalance and Underrepresentation
A second concern is the composition of the Committee, given the
geological and public-health-related conclusions of the Academy
report. There appears to have been only one person on the Committee
with an advanced degree in geology or hydrogeology (Jean Bahr), only
one with an advanced degree in hydrology (Fred Phillips), only one in
public health (Melvin Carter), and only one medical doctor (Arthur
Upton) out of fifteen members. Instead, most of the members have
degrees in physics or engineering. More geologists - particularly
specialists in long-term seismic and volcanic prediction and in long-
term prediction of rock distress under natural circumstances - might
have been useful. Especially in the light of the report of the prestigious
peer reviewers, adding volcanologists and seismologists might have
forced the Committee to consider and address each of the serious
scientific misgivings expressed by the peer reviewers of the DOE report.
Also, because the Academy Committee's charge was "to conduct a
study to provide findings and recommendations on reasonable
standards for protection of the public health and safety," it seems
important to have more than one medical doctor and more than one
public-health expert on a Committee of fifteen members. While it is
true that such a group can seek expertise from outside, its day-to-day
deliberations and decisions need to be accomplished by people who
adequately represent the most relevant areas of the Committee charge.
To have one public-health expert, on a committee of fifteen charged
with making public-health recommendations, is questionable. Also, as
well as a "balance of expertise," committees need a "balance of
approach." Public-health experts often approach health and safety issues
differently than physicists or engineers. Given an Academy Committee
dominated by physicists and engineers and with only one public-health
expert, it is easy to see that the conclusions may not be as balanced and
well considered as they could be.
The concern about sufficient representation in medicine and public
health is especially relevant because one member, Thomas Pigford,
criticized the recommended exposure scenario as "more permissive than
current national and international practice" and said that "its adoption
would undermine confidence in the adequacy of public health
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protection." Whether Pigford is correct or not, more representation in
the areas of medicine and public health might have alleviated such
concerns and given the Academy report more credibility.
ICRP Recommendations Appear More Protective of Public Health
A third concern about the report is that it rejects the radiological
protections recommended by the ICRP, the most influential body
recommending radiation standards today.2 5 Specifically, the report
rejects the ICRP risk-based and dose-based (in favor merely of a risk-
based) radiation standard. The document also rejects the ICRP
ALARA (keep exposures as low as reasonably achievable) rule,2 6 and it
appears to reject the ICRP principle of optimizing radiation protection
and limiting inequity in exposures.27
Although there are theoretical reasons for the Committee to reject
the double ICRP dose and risk standards, and instead to recommend
standards based only on radiation risk (that is, based on the expected
value of the probabilistic distribution of health effects), the
Committee's decision is questionable. Its choice of risk, rather than
dose and risk standards, appears least practical in the very situation
(million-year repository protection) in which the Committee proposes
it. The Committee seems correct that, in situations in which the
relevant probabilities and consequences can be known precisely, risk
may be as desirable a standard as both dose and risk. For situations
covering estimates over the next million years, however, it is less clear
that a risk standard is preferable to the double ICRP standards of both
dose and risk. One reason is that long-term estimates of risk are much
less reliable than short-term estimates. Also, actual doses usually can be
measured, whereas risks always must be calculated, often on the basis of
subjective judgments. The longer the time period of calculation, the
more subjective are the judgments used.
The Committee argued that a benefit of their risk (as compared to
the ICRP risk and dose) standard was that it would not need to be
changed, as knowledge of the dose-response relationship changed.
25 Technical Bases, supra note 1. at 4.
26 See International Commission on Radiation Protection, Recommendations of
the International Commission on Radiation Protection, 28, 71 (Pub. 60 1991).
27 Id.
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However, as technology improves, inexpensive ways of avoiding
needless risks are likely to force some risk standards to change, perhaps
to become more protective. Hence both dose and risk standards seem
likely to change. Facing possible future changes in standards, the ICRP
came to a conclusion opposite to that of the Academy Committee.
Providing for additional protection (likely possible because of future
technology) is one reason that the ICRP argues that "the choice of
[radiation exposure] limits cannot be based on health considerations
[risk] alone." A technology-based dose standard is also required. As the
ICRP puts it, "ideally" both a dose and a risk standard are required,
even for potential exposures. 2 8 For all the preceding reasons, it is
questionable for the Committee to recommend only a risk standard.
Indeed, as the ICRP notes, a risk-based radiation-protection standard
- although often reasonable as a supplement to a dose-based standard
- appears to be most needed in the very cases in which it is the least
useful: cases where time periods (therefore uncertainties) are great.
As the ICRP dose standards recognize, 2 9 when the relevant
million-year probabilities and consequences are not known precisely -
as they are not at permanent repositories like Yucca Mountain - using
a risk-based standard, alone, can cause serious scientific and health-
related problems. Using a risk standard, alone, may (1) require using
arbitrary risk models and assumptions about unknowable future
situations, (2) be vulnerable to manipulation by those doing the
calculations and choosing the distributions, (3) remove the public's
guarantee that exposures will be below a given dose and, most
importantly, (4) may generate public controversy because of its
complexity and susceptibility to manipulation. Although the proposed
risk-based standard is desirable in including potential health effects of
radionuclides, 3 0 members of the public can nevertheless "count on"
particular dose standards. They know there will be a definite limit to
their exposures, regardless of what experts say. Members of the public
are less able to count on something subject to potentially arbitrary
assumptions and models. Citizens may believe that they are being
asked to "sign a blank check" if they are asked to give up the protection
28 Id. at 31.
29 Id. at 32.
30 Technical Bases, supra note 1. at 30, 63.
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of current dose limits and instead to rely on a standard based on yet-
to-be-specified models and assumptions about what will happen in a
million years.
This "blank check" may become all the more onerous to the degree
that radiation protection relies on expert judgment about exposure
models, rather than firm guidelines about dose. The "blank check" also
may not work if the public is susceptible to "lack of trust in DOE."
Besides, practically speaking, a risk imposer cannot adhere to a (risk)
standard if he has to perform calculations to determine exactly what
the standard requires. Such a standard also would seem to lend itself to
"after-the-fact" justifications of exposures, based on whatever was
necessary to exonerate the risk imposer. If the current climate of
controversy and distrust continues,3 1 and if the U.S. adopts the risk-
based standard, then citizens might easily imagine something like the
following scenario. (1) Citizens receive a future exposure to high levels
of radiation. (2) Public outcry results from this exposure. (3) Regulators
and industry officials (the risk imposers) try to protect themselves from
public criticism by doing an after-the-fact assessment of whether the
high radiation releases violated risk standards. (4) Officials, sur-
prisingly, reach the "conclusion" that the high radiation exposure really
was associated with a very low risk.
Although a dose standard, alone, appears to have limitations (such
as its needing to be changed), employing a risk standard, alone, has the
same flaw. However, using the dose standard has the merit of being
clear and dependable - no small one in a health standard. As a recent
Committee of the National Research Council put it: "Give the public
clear-cut, noncontroversial statements of regulatory philosophy."'32
To understand why the 1995 report appears questionable in
recommending risk standards and in rejecting dual risk and dose
standards, knowledge of ICRP principles is essential. The ICRP argues
that there are at least two cases to which radiation-protection standards
are relevant, "exposures" - which we have some reason to expect -
and "potential exposures" - for which we have "no certainty that they
31 Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste (Riley Dunlap, Michael Kraft & Eugene Rosa,
eds. 1993).
32 National Research Council, Improving Risk Communication, 284 (1989).
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will occur" or which "may not occur." The ICRP also argues that "dose
constraints" are appropriate for "exposures," whereas "risk constraints"
are also appropriate for "potential exposures." Because some radioactive
waste is certain to lead to exposures over the million-year lifetime of the
proposed repository, and because virtually all experts forecast that some
exposure will eventually occur, it is arguable that Yucca Mountain will
eventually lead to "exposures," and hence that the Committee report
ought not have rejected dose constraints in favor merely of risk
constraints. It would have been better for the report, instead, to follow
ICRP guidelines and to propose dose constraints, or combined dose
and risk constraints, which the ICRP says is the "ideal" way of
restricting potential exposures, 3 3 rather than for the Committee to
propose merely "risk constraints," as it has done.
Even in cases of "potential exposure," the ICRP recommends using
both dose and risk constraints, 34 for at least three reasons. First, "a
potential exposure may become a real exposure." Second, the ICRP
warns that assessing risk is more difficult than assessing dose because in
the former case "it is necessary to depend on an examination of the
procedures for estimating the probability of the exposures. The
probabilities cannot be directly determined." In other words, the ICRP
warns against the very arbitrariness in future risk calculations already
described as a potential problem with the risk-based recommendations
of the report. Third, according to the ICRP, the dose standard is
needed not only "as a limiting restriction on the design and operation
of an installation," but also for "its original function of applying
controls on each individual's accumulation of dose." Obviously it is
much easier to apply controls to an individual's radiation exposure if
one has a dose standard than if one has a risk standard subject to
potentially arbitrary assumptions about population and distribution.
The dose standard clearly specifies that, independent of any
assumptions about population or its distribution, no individual ought to
be exposed above a certain limit. Moreover, individuals can "count on"
this control in exactly the way the ICRP noted.35
33 ICRP at 31.
3 4 Id.
35 Id.
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For reasons discussed, using a risk standard, alone, as the report
proposes, appears less clear and more controversial than using a
combined dose and risk standard, as the ICRP recommends. For risks
a million years in the future, the devil you know (measurable dose) may
be better than only the devil you do not know (calculable risk). Ideally,
of course, the acceptability of dose ought to be a function of the risk it
entails, but risk is often less measurable than actual dose. Risk, alone,
also may not be an adequate standard, given the variety of (and likely
changes in) waste-related technologies.
The Committee also leaves itself open to question because it fails to
follow ICRP standards that require radiation exposure to be "as low as
reasonably achievable" (ALARA).36 Its grounds for rejecting ALARA
are that such a technology-based standard is not useful in discussing
nuclear waste disposal because "technological alternatives for repository
design are quite limited." Repository decision makers, however, have
many technological options - such as whether to use double-walled
versus single-walled, or copper versus stainless-steel, canisters. At least
some of these options appear to pose choices that ALARA might
require. Moreover, the ICRP adopted ALARA in large part to promote
a "culture of safety," to tell people to optimize safety, and to pursue
maximum vigilance. It adopted ALARA to keep people from blindly
following dose or risk limits. Indeed, the optimization principle
(optimizing safety) and ALARA constitute one of the three main
foundations of ICRP radiation-protection norms.3 7 In rejecting
ALARA, the Committee appears to sanction something less.
Although the Committee is correct to point out that demonstrating
compliance with ALARA is sometimes difficult, 3 8 courts in the U.K.
have found that British Nuclear Fuels violated ALARA in disposing of
radioactive waste, and courts in France have held that industries
violated regulations by failing to keep exposures ALARA. Given this
legal and regulatory background, the report's rejecting ALARA (and its
goal of optimizing protection and equity) places the Committee in the
questionable position of recommending a policy change which is less
protective of public health and safety. The report appears to sanction
36 Id. at 28, 71.
37 Id.
38 Technical Bases, supra note 1. at 13.
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radiation standards that are less protective than those of the ICRP, even
though the ICRP explicitly warns against blindly following a dose or
risk limit "when the optimization of protection [ALARA] is the more
appropriate course of action."39
To be consistent with ICRP recommendations, the Committee
could have retained the dose limit on the releases from the repository.
For example, it could have allowed a dose standard of 0.25 mSv/yr, as
the French do,4 0 and it could have added a proposed risk standard to
this dose limit. If the risk standard is as protective as the dose standard,
then adopting it gives the public no cause for alarm and actually
provides benefits, as the Committee recognizes. 4 1 If the risk standard
is not as protective, then adopting it alone is problematic anyway. There
are at least three reasons that it is questionable for the Committee to
have rejected making such a dual recommendation on grounds of
avoiding policy. First, the recommendation to use only a risk-based
standard is itself already a policy decision. Second, this policy decision
deviates from current ICRP policy. Third, if the decision is truly a
matter of policy, then public rule making may be the better way to
make it.
39 ICRP at 31.
40 Technical Bases, supra note 1. at 126.
41 Id. at 30, 63.
